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•   A bst ra k t   • 
Grupa Wyszehradzka (V4) powstała by wspo-
móc starania państw europy Środkowej – Pol-
ski, Czechosłowacji (od 1993 r. Czech i sło-
wacji) oraz Węgier o członkostwo w NatO 
i Wspólnotach europejskich. Po pierwszych la-
tach istnienia zakończonych osiągnięciem za-
kładanych celów, po 2004 r. musiała na nowo 
zdefiniować swoją rolę i zadania. Nowa formu-
ła Grupy Wyszehradzkiej po 2004 r. zakłada-
ła ścisłą współpracę państw członkowskich na 
forum unii europejskiej. strategia połącze-
nia potencjałów państw V4 w negocjacjach 
na poziomie unijnym w założeniu jest słusz-
na, gdyż może prowadzić do zwiększenia zna-
czenia regionu w procesie decyzyjnym. W ar-
tykule omówiona została geneza i ewolucja V4 
do 2004 r. Następnie przedstawiona została 
współpraca wyszehradzka w zakresie Wspólnej 
Polityki zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa ue. 
W tekście analizie poddano konkretne wyda-
rzenia rzutujące na bezpieczeństwo europy 
w ostatnich latach. analiza zaangażowania V4 
w kształtowanie WPziB ue została oparta na 
materiałach źródłowych, w tym przede wszyst-
kim dokumentach wypracowanych przez orga-
•   A bst rac t   • 
The Visegrad Group (V4) was formed with the 
aim to support Central european countries – 
Poland, Czechoslovakia (since 1993 the Czech 
Republic and slovakia) and Hungary in their 
efforts to join NatO and the european Com-
munities. V4 had to redefine its role and tasks 
after 2004 having achieved the set objectives 
in the first years of its existence. The new for-
mat of the Visegrad Group made provisions 
for a close cooperation between member states 
within the european union. The strategy of 
combining potentials of the V4 states in nego-
tiations on the eu level is based on reasonable 
assumptions, as it may lead to an increased sig-
nificance of the region in the decision-making 
process. The article discusses the genesis and 
evolution of the V4 up to 2004. Next there is 
presented Visegrad cooperation in the field of 
the Common foreign and security Policy of 
the eu. The text analysis specific issues project-
ing the safety of europe in recent years. The 
analysis of the commitment of V4 in the shap-
ing of the eu CfsP will be based on source 
materials, mainly on documents produced by 
the authorities of the Visegrad Group such as 
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The Visegrad Group (V4), formed with the aim to support Central european 
countries – Poland, Czechoslovakia (since 1993 the Czech Republic and slovakia) 
and Hungary in their efforts to join NatO and the european Communities, had 
to redefine its role and tasks after 2004 having achieved the set objectives in the 
first years of its existence. The new format of the Visegrad Group made provisions 
for a close cooperation between member states within the european union. The 
strategy of combining potentials of the V4 states in negotiations on the eu level is 
based on reasonable assumptions, as it may lead to an increased significance of the 
region in the decision-making process. in the article, the following research ques-
tions are subject to analysis: Q1. What are the common interests of the Visegrad 
Group member states?; Q2. Do the V4 member states manifest mutual loyalty in 
supporting their proposals and initiatives within the eu institutions?; Q3. What 
is the actual impact of V4 on the eu policy?
The analysis of the commitment of V4 in the shaping of the eu CfsP will be 
based on source materials, mainly on documents produced by the authorities of 
the Visegrad Group such as presidency programmes, statements, declarations and 
annual reports.
until the early 1990s, Poland had a limited experience in political or economic 
integration. One could refer here to historical processes, i.e., Polish-lithuanian 
union, though in this particular case it is difficult to specify any analogies with 
the present-day integration processes. in the post-war period, Poland was forced 
to cooperate within the soviet Bloc due to geopolitical reasons. The Council for 
Mutual economic assistance provided no actual chance of economic integration, 
being solely a tool for controlling trade between the former socialist countries. 
after the breakthrough of 1989, Poland and other countries of the region found 
themselves in a kind of a “void” both in terms of security and economy. it was pos-
sible to overcome this difficult situation by building new alliances, either official 
or unofficial. from the very beginning of the transition, Polish diplomacy made 
efforts to prevent Poland from isolation or marginalisation on the international 
arena. two of these initiatives, namely the Visegrad Group and the Weimar trian-
ny Grupy Wyszehradzkiej, takich jak progra-
my prezydencji, oświadczenia, deklaracje i ra-
porty roczne.
S łowa k luc z owe : Grupa Wyszehradzka, 
Wspólna Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony 
(WPBiO), Wspólna Polityka zagraniczna i Bez-
pieczeństwa (WPziB), kryzys migracyjny
presidency programmes, statements, declara-
tions and annual reports.
Ke y word s : Visegrad Group (V4), Common 
security and Defence Policy (CsDP), Common 
foreign and security Policy (CfsP), european 
Neighbourhood Policy (eNP), migration crisis
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gle, had a particular importance in this context. The former consisted of countries 
with a similar Communist-authority experience in the post-war period, whereas 
the latter was an example of overcoming past divisions and gave way for a coop-
eration between Poland and Western european countries. importantly, neither 
the Visegrad Group nor the Weimar triangle ever gained a fully institutionalised 
form and thus they remain forums of regional cooperation to this day.
The idea of regional cooperation between the three countries: Poland, Czecho-
slovakia and Hungary was officially proposed for the first time by president of 
Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel during his visit in Poland in January 1990, where at 
a joint sitting of the sejm and senate he stated, “for the first time in history, we 
have a real opportunity to fill the great political vacuum that appeared in Central 
europe after the collapse of the Hapsburg empire with something genuinely 
meaningful. We have an opportunity to transform Central europe from what has 
been a mainly historical and spiritual phenomenon into a political phenomenon” 
(Address given by Vaclav Havel to the Polish Sejm and Senate, 1990). Havel stated 
the necessity to establish a closer Polish-Czechoslovakian-Hungarian cooperation 
yet again on the following day at his speech in the Hungarian Parliament. The first 
meeting of presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers took place in the 
spring of the same year in Bratislava. The meeting was also attended by members 
of parliament of the three countries. They were largely former oppositionists. 
Thus, a significant parliamentary aspect of the Visegrad cooperation has been ini-
tiated, which was particularly important in the following years due to the legal 
harmonisation of the Visegrad Group member states that would adapt them to the 
eu requirements (5. Spotkanie Komisji Administracji Publicznej i Polityki Region-
alnej Parlamentów Państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej z udziałem właściwych Komisji 
Parlamentów Słowenii oraz Chorwacji, 2013). interestingly, the said meeting did 
not bring any specific statements despite being driven to a considerable extent by 
a willingness to strengthen the global position of Czechoslovakia who sought 
membership in Quadragonale, i.e., the adriatic-Danube cooperation formed at the 
time by Yugoslavia, Hungary, austria and italy (Czyż, 2014)1. already at that 
stage, this demonstrated certain discrepancies, which later resulted in the collabo-
ration becoming weaker or even occasionally suspended. Nonetheless, after the 
meeting in Bratislava, preparations for the rapprochement of Central european 
countries took place in the following months. The document that officially consti-
1 Czechoslovakia attained its objective and was admitted to the group, which hence changed 
its name to Pentagonale. a year later, it was also joined by Poland and the name was thus changed 
yet again, this time to Hexagonale. after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the 
forum was eventually renamed “the Central european initiative”, which remains valid to this day.
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tuted the cooperation was signed on 15 february 1991 in Visegrad, Hungary, by 
Presidents Vaclav Havel and lech Wałęsa and Prime Minister Josef antall under 
the name Declaration on Cooperation Between the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub-
lic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European 
Integration (Deklaracja o współpracy, 1991). The said document determined basic 
objectives of cooperation that were to be executed together by all states in the fol-
lowing years: firstly, to restore full independence, democracy and liberty of the 
state; secondly, to eliminate all existing social, economic and spiritual manifesta-
tions of a totalitarian system; thirdly, to create a parliamentary democracy, a mod-
ern state, to respect human rights and basic human liberties; fourthly, to create 
a modern market economy; and fifthly, to become fully engaged in the european 
political and economic systems, as well as security systems and systems of legisla-
tion. The element that later proved important (if not the most important) was the 
formalisation of the commercial and economic cooperation by the V4 member 
states. The Declaration itself involved an announcement of a closer cooperation in 
this regard, “(…) in order to support free flow of labour force and capital, they 
shall develop economic cooperation, based on the principles of the free market and 
mutually beneficial trade in goods and services, moreover they shall strive to create 
favourable conditions for direct cooperation of enterprises and foreign capital in-
vestments, aimed at improving economic effectiveness” (Deklaracja o współpracy, 
1991). This served as the basis for signing the Central european free trade agree-
ment (Cefta) on 21 December 1992 in Cracow. The agreement provided for 
a creation of a free-trade area by 1 January 2001 and prohibited the use of non-
tariff measures that hinder trade between the state parties of the agreement 
(kisiel-Łowczyc, 2001). The economic integration and the determined trade liber-
alisation schedule were executed without major problems. The matter of political 
cooperation is somewhat different. in terms of the Visegrad cooperation, the pe-
riod of 1993–1998 may be regarded as a wasted time. This was affected by several 
factors, the most important of which was the radicalisation of political life in slo-
vakia and a shift in its foreign policy towards Russia under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Vladimir Mečiar. another issue is the divergence between other member 
states. in this regard, the words of Czech Prime Minister Vaclav klaus were all the 
more striking. in 1992, in an interview for the french daily Le Figaro klaus said 
that as an “artificial” process launched in east-Central europe possibly by Brus-
sels, Visegrad was of no concern to the Czech Republic (kiss, 1997). klaus’s words 
were dictated by the belief shared by the Czech diplomacy, according to which 
Poland constitutes a burden and not an added value in the efforts to join the eu-
ropean Communities, since at that time, the Czech Republic and Hungary han-
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dled economic transition much better. The reluctance towards a closer coopera-
tion manifested by the Czech Republic and Hungary was caused also by concerns 
about the entire process being dominated by Poland, which surpasses the other 
three countries in the aspect of area and demographic potential. in the second half 
of the 1990s, the political cooperation within the Visegrad Group was renewed. 
This proved possible after a change of the slovakian government. The new Prime 
Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda decided to implement a shift in foreign policy and to 
reengage in the efforts to join NatO and the eu. The symbolic renewal of po-
litical cooperation in V4 took place on 21 October 1998 in Budapest, where the 
prime ministers of the V4 countries were to assemble at least twice a year. On 
1 May 2004, the objectives set out in the Visegrad Declaration were attained by 
all the four countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, slovakia and Hungary have 
all become member states of the eu2. This successful attainment put the future of 
the Visegrad Group into question. in that situation, it was agreed that the Viseg-
rad forum should be continued and that the cooperation will be taken to the level 
of the eu to allow their interests in matters important to the region to be de-
fended in a more effective way. On 12 May 2004 in kroměříž prime ministers of 
the four countries adopted a declaration of cooperation after their accession to the 
european union. The declaration stated “The Visegrad Group countries are 
strongly determined to jointly contributing to the fulfilment of the european un-
ion’s common goals and objectives and to the successful continuation of the euro-
pean integration. They reiterate their commitment to the enlargement process of 
the european union. They are ready to assist countries aspiring for eu member-
ship by sharing and transmitting their knowledge and experience. The Visegrad 
Group countries are also ready to use their unique regional and historical experi-
ence and to contribute to shaping and implementing the european union’s poli-
cies towards the countries of eastern and southeastern europe” (The Kroměříž 
Declaration, 2004). The above statement points out the willingness to join the 
europeanisation process on two levels: the inner level within the eu and the for-
eign level by means of assisting in the expansion and sharing one’s own experience 
with subsequent countries that express aspiration similar to those of the V4 mem-
ber states in the early 1990s. Regarding the Common foreign and security Policy, 
an “active contribution” in the development of that very area of the eu coopera-
tion was declared. The commitment to internal issues and to the foreign coopera-
2 Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have joined NatO on 12 March 1999, whereas 
slovakia on 29 March 2004. NatO Members. Retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/nato-wel-
come/index.html#members.
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tion of the eu is confirmed by another declaration adopted on 15 february 2011 
in Bratislava on the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the Visegrad coopera-
tion (The Bratislava Declaration, 2011). The document stresses the need to improve 
the V4 visibility on the international arena by means of active promotion of closer 
relations between the eu and the member states of the eastern Partnership 
and the Western Balkans, which includes assisting them in their european aspira-
tions and engaging in the development of the Common foreign and security 
Policy and the Common security and Defence Policy of the eu while taking the 
interests of the Central european region into consideration (The Bratislava Decla-
ration, 2011).
The membership in the eu and NatO allowed the Visegrad Group member 
states to change their geopolitical situation in only several years. Once satellite 
states of the soviet union, they have become fully integrated global actors by tak-
ing part in operations of two organisations of key importance for international 
economic and military security. However, the way in which this potential will be 
used was and still is open to discussion due to various scenarios that come into 
play, which oftentimes depend on the current political situation in a given coun-
try. One should note that the Visegrad Group is not the only existing forum of 
cooperation between Poland, the Czech Republic, slovakia and Hungary. each 
of these countries is simultaneously engaged in several subregional initiatives with 
interests that are not always compatible. for instance, apart from the Visegrad 
collaboration, Poland takes part also in the operations of the Weimar triangle to-
gether with Germany and france, as well as in the Council of the Baltic sea states 
together with the scandinavian countries, the Baltic states, Germany, iceland and 
Russia. another issue regarding the cooperation and defining common objectives 
is the foreign policy of the individual V4 states, which often depends on their 
economic interests or historical circumstances. One should also bear in mind that 
despite being an added value, the shared experience of political transition consti-
tutes an area of competition between the Visegrad states within the eu in seeking 
financial support, particularly regarding cohesion policy resources. Due to the 
above conditions, finding common objectives for the V4 member states to focus 
their activity on is difficult, though not impossible. in many aspects, the european 
union is an atypical international organisation where the decision-making process 
is particularly dependent on the ability to form official and unofficial coalitions 
(Hix, 2010). The area of the Common foreign and security Policy, including its 
component the Common security and Defence Policy, is a specific dimension of 
cooperation, as it has a direct impact on the issues related to sovereignty and, thus, 
the member states are not willing to adopt far-reaching regulations (Hoffmann, 
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1966), while for each of them it is important to ensure the highest security level 
possible and a high position on the international arena. as a rule, decisions re-
garding CfsP are taken with unanimity (Węc, 2016), which makes the ability to 
win over other states particularly important and that comes easier with coalition 
capacity. in this regard, the impact exerted by the V4 member states is average, as 
most often issues considered to be a priority for the east-Central europe region 
are seen by other countries as insignificant or conflicting with their interests. This 
internal division within the eu regarding foreign policy can be exemplified by 
the implementation of the european Neighbourhood Policy (eNP). The V4 dec-
larations accepted following the annexation to the eu stressed the willingness to 
commit to promoting cooperation with the countries of the eastern neighbour-
hood, primarily with ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia. Meanwhile, eastern eu-
rope has little meaning for most Western and southern eu member states, as they 
focus on the southern area of the Mediterranean sea. for that very reason, the 
establishment of the eastern Partnership, which is one of the dimensions of the 
european Neighbourhood Policy, was considered a success of Polish diplomacy 
that managed to acquire the support of sweden and the Czech Republic, as well as 
to convince Germany to advocate that idea. The eastern Partnership Programme, 
which was inaugurated on 7 May 2009 at a meeting of the european Council in 
Prague, is targeted at six countries, namely, Belarus, ukraine, Moldavia, Geor-
gia, armenia and azerbaijan (Barabasz, Piechocki, 2012; Mizerska-Wrotkowska, 
2011). The actual implementation of the objectives of the eastern Partnership and 
the level of involvement of the individual V4 member states, as well as the impact 
of V4 on the eNP reform are yet another issue.
an important element of the Kroměříž Declaration of 2004 is the establish-
ment of a rotating annual presidency of the Visegrad Group. since then, each of 
the member states that consecutively assumed leadership over the Group is obliged 
to develop a separate programme concerning current activities that allows the V4 
member states to maintain permanent cooperation. The last element that con-
cludes every presidency is the annual summit of the prime ministers of the V4 
countries held in June, during which activities are resumed and new tasks are de-
termined. apart from at least one official summit of the prime ministers at the 
time of a given presidency, another key tool of cooperation within the Visegrad 
Group are occasional unofficial meetings of prime ministers or other ministers 
(mainly foreign ministers) that aim to seek a common position or are held due to 
upcoming international events. a common element of a presidency are meetings 
at the level of deputy ministers of foreign affairs that lay the groundwork for offi-
cial meetings of prime ministers (The Kroměříž Declaration, 2004). Collaboration 
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between other ministers and national V4 coordinators, as well as within the Per-
manent Representations of the eu, NatO and consultations within, e.g., OsCe, 
the uN, the european Council, etc., can take place at the same time. The Guide-
lines on the Future Areas of Visegrad Cooperation (2004) determine four most vital 
areas of cooperation, which include: cooperation within the V4 area (strictly 
speaking); cooperation within the eu; cooperation within other partners; and 
cooperation within NatO and other international organisations. such a broad 
framework of cooperation between the V4 member states places the declaration of 
commitment to cooperation as part of the intensification of operations under the 
Common foreign and security Policy (CfsP) not only in the context of coopera-
tion within the eu (and the implementation of the “Wider europe – Neighbour-
hood” policy in particular) or in the context of the eu’s approach towards the 
Western Balkans, but also makes it fall into other areas of cooperation. What is 
more, consultations and coordination of actions arising from the schengen coop-
eration that pertain largely to the security and management of external borders 
were taken into consideration as well (The Guidelines..., 2004). During the Polish 
presidency of 2004–2005, a meeting of defence ministers regarding defence and 
military matters was held in autumn 2004. at the meeting, the postulates of the 
Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) were confirmed to be fully accepted, the 
collaboration between defence industry companies was declared to be strength-
ened, and systematic consultations were agreed to be carried out in matters regard-
ing international safety with particular focus on regional safety issues and the use 
of stabilisation and peace missions to this end. furthermore, the need for employ-
ing the capabilities of the eu agencies that deal with the development of the de-
fensive potential, particularly the european Defence agency (eDa) was also ad-
dressed. The willingness to continue the cooperation between national armaments 
directors was confirmed together with the strengthening of the collaboration be-
tween working groups at the ministerial level, such as tristand, tRiCOD, asoc 
(2004/2005 Polish Presidency). Whereas the Hungarian presidency of 2005–2006 
was dominated by common foreign policy matters and cooperation under the 
neighbourhood policy regarding ukraine, but also other Cis member states and 
the Western Balkan countries. among others, the necessity to support democratic 
reforms in ukraine was noted, since in July 2005 a meeting between the foreign 
ministers of the V4 countries and the foreign minister of ukraine took place, aim-
ing at laying the groundwork for a summit of prime ministers of these countries. 
as for the Western Balkan countries, consideration was given to the necessity to 
support their aspirations to the eu membership. Moreover, the Visegrad Group 
confirmed the willingness to cooperate with the Cis yet again, concluding that 
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sharing own experience gained during the social, political and economic transi-
tions may prove particularly useful for the countries of that region. During the 
Hungarian presidency, focus was also put on the cooperation not only between V4 
and both austria and slovenia but also the member states of the Nordic Council 
(2005/2006 Hungarian Presidency: Report). similar declarations and resulting ac-
tions were proclaimed and implemented during the consecutive slovakian presi-
dency of 2006–2007. Here, seeking coordination of V4 activities in supporting 
ukraine’s efforts to join the eu and NatO was still the main priority alongside 
improving V4 activity in the Western Balkans as part of the implementation of the 
provisions of the Western Balkans conference that took place in Budapest on 
11 October 2005. The aim of the slovakian presidency of V4 was to improve fur-
ther effective implementation of the Common foreign and security Policy (CfsP) 
and the european security and Defence Policy (esDP) by attempting to converge 
views of the V4 member states in their approach to the said areas. The Visegrad 
Group also declared support for the CsDP development by strengthening the col-
laboration within the transatlantic security community (2006/2007 Slovak Presi-
dency). The Czech presidency of 2007–2008 pertained mostly to the strengthen-
ing of the collaboration between the Visegrad Group, austria and slovenia (V4+2), 
as well as to promoting common endeavours with, i.a., the Nordic Council mem-
ber states, the Baltic states, ukraine, Moldavia and Japan (2007/2008 Czech Pres-
idency). These operations were continued (V4+) during the subsequent Polish 
presidency of 2008–2009, when the collaboration was improved and the instru-
ment was maintained, as it was considered vital for strengthening of the political 
transition processes in, i.a., Belarus, ukraine, Moldavia and the countries of the 
south Caucasus. Moreover, in line with the conclusions of the european Council 
of December 2007, during the Polish presidency steps were undertaken by the V4 
countries to confirm that the Western Balkan countries ought to continue their 
integration with the eu. additionally, a significant objective of the Polish presi-
dency at that period was to determine and implement a consistent position that 
accepted the “open door” policy towards ukraine and Georgia by means of work-
ing operations and to ensure commitment to promoting international security 
strategy in the relations between Russia and the Caucasus. The Polish presidency 
has made a considerable contribution to the issue of ukraine by promoting this 
country with consideration to prospective membership both due to consultations 
regarding ukraine’s participation in the operations of the eu institutions or Com-
munity policies, and the V4 support of ukraine’s aspiration to become a member 
of the energy Community (2008/2009 Polish Presidency). During the Hungarian 
presidency of 2009–2010, the focus of joint activities taken by V4 was put on sup-
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porting the accession of the Western Balkan countries into the eu and ensuring 
their integration with NatO, at the same time indicating a model that could be 
used in the future, i.e., the efficient accession process undertaken by Croatia. 
What is more, during the Hungarian presidency of V4 a suggestion to engage in 
supporting accession negotiations conducted by turkey with the eu was made, 
since according to Hungarian politicians a perspective of being a member of the 
eu should motivate turkish policy-makers to advance reforms necessary for that 
country. The Hungarian presidency also made provisions for assisting the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in strengthening of its ties with the eu and in 
seeking full membership in NatO. Moreover, the Hungarian presidency of V4 
anticipated support provided by the Visegrad Group to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
and Montenegro’s efforts aiming at joining NatO, but also at strengthening the 
relation between NatO and serbia while offering support to albania and Mon-
tenegro in continuing their operations after the ratification of the saa. The Hun-
garians did not refrain from taking steps for the benefit of the eastern Partnership, 
claiming that the unique experience of the V4 member states in establishing rela-
tions with the eu can be helpful for ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia alike, which 
are undergoing such process (2009/2010 Hungarian Presidency: Annual Report). 
The slovakian presidency of 2010–2011 regarding security and defence merely 
concerned promoting the participation of the V4 countries both in civilian and 
military activities, as well as those related to the crisis response on the interna-
tional arena. The slovakians also proposed a resumption of negotiations on estab-
lishing the eu battlegroup consisting of V4 countries and arranging joint military 
exercises, which was accepted by all the ministers of national defence of the V4 
countries. Moreover, risks related to cyberterrorism and issues related to the re-
birth of radical views and groups worldwide were discussed (Annual Implementa-
tion Report, 2010/2011). similar issues prevailed during the Czech presidency of 
2011–2012, when the idea of creating the battlegroup was addressed again with 
the date of establishment set at the first half of 2016. What is more, the work re-
lated to the programme of the eastern Partnership and the aid for the Western 
Balkans was continued (Innovative Visegrad, 2011/2012). as for the foreign policy 
of the subsequent Polish presidency of 2012–2013, the main focus was put on cur-
rent european matters. Positions of the V4 countries concerning preparations for 
the european Council, the foreign affairs Council (faC) and the General affairs 
Council (GaC) were coordinated. at the very same time, the presidency was 
dominated by sectoral cooperation within V4, which mostly pertained to the mat-
ters related to the future cohesion policy, regional policy and strategic program-
ming. furthermore, the Polish presidency continued a process initiated during 
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former presidencies led by the Czech Republic and slovakia related to the presence 
of the Visegrad Group in the region and the launch of a special programme of the 
international Visegrad fund concerning the eastern Partnership, since further 
promotion of V4 cooperation and expansion of the said cooperation with activities 
and programmes that provide support to the eastern Partnership was a long-term 
task of the V4 member states significant to Poland. During the Polish presidency, 
consultations were held with the european external action service (eeas) and 
a competent Directorate General of the european Commission (DG DeVCO) 
concerning the task schedule for the eastern Partnership programme. as for the 
contacts with the Western Balkans, Poland proposed to establish cooperation with 
Croatia (following accession of the latter to the eu) on the V4+ forum, which 
could contribute to activities supporting european aspirations of other Western 
Balkan countries. One of the other issues addressed during the Polish presidency 
was the representation of the V4 member states among the staff of the european 
external action service (eeas), thus suggesting that joint actions should be tak-
en to recruit diplomats from national services of the V4 countries to the eeas. 
The necessity to attain common positions and to present them on international 
fora (i.a., uN, eu, NatO, OsCe) was stressed and encouraged among the V4 
member states. another addressed issue was the fight against terrorism, in which 
case the Polish presidency, similarly to former ones, ended in a declaration made 
by all the V4 member states to undertake actions aiming at strengthening, im-
proving and coordinating antiterrorist systems within V4. Poland also suggested 
intensification of actions taken by the V4 countries within the uN by introducing 
the practice of consulting the heads of the uN facilities of the V4 member states 
and directors of the departments for uN affairs of the Ministry of foreign affairs 
in Warsaw on ongoing basis, and by maintaining permanent expert-level contact 
within V4 in matters covered by the agenda of the security Council, the General 
assembly and its committees, as well as specialist agencies and organisations 
(2012/2013 Polish Presidency). During the consecutive Hungarian presidency of 
2013–2014, the formerly initiated tasks were continued and attempts were made 
to ensure that the collaboration on security and defence becomes the main focus 
of actions taken by the V4 countries, largely within the framework of sectoral co-
operation. This was related to concerns about the security and stability of europe 
and its neighbours in the context of the ongoing armed conflict in ukraine. in the 
course of the preparations for the european Council in December 2013, the for-
eign ministers and the prime ministers of the V4 member states issued a statement 
regarding the importance of CsDP in international crisis management, whereas 
the ministers of national defence agreed that it was necessary to organise annual 
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joint military exercises as of 2015. it was also agreed that the battlegroup formed 
by the V4 countries ought to serve as the basis for regional deployment of forces 
within NatO and the eu and could also be used during military missions. Con-
currently, on 24 June 2014, the prime ministers of the V4 have adopted the so-
called Budapest Declaration, which provides a fresh impetus in the field of security 
cooperation. The new strategy not only assumes joint military exercises and train-
ing, but also an increasingly closer cooperation in the defence industry. as for the 
matters of collaboration on the V4+ forum, meetings of experts and foreign min-
isters of countries, such as, Denmark, estonia, finland, iceland, latvia, lithua-
nia, Norway and sweden were launched. The first meetings were held in Budapest 
on 21 January 2014. an interesting event within the framework of V4-Japan co-
operation was a seminar on security that took place on 4 february 2014 in tokyo. 
Moreover, as the host of the V4 presidency at that time, Hungary co-organised 
and co-funded the 9th GlOBseC international security conference that took 
place between 14–16 May 2014 in Bratislava (2013/2014 Hungarian Presidency). 
The slovakian presidency of 2014–2015 was a continuation of actions initiated 
during the Hungarian presidency, while relations within V4 were dominated at 
that time by migrant issues. The slovakian diplomacy organised numerous meet-
ings at various levels (involving prime ministers, foreign ministers and experts). 
These debates resulted in a common position of the V4 countries regarding the 
implementation of obligatory immigrant quotas. another significant event that 
affected the slovakian presidency was the Russian-ukrainian conflict. The V4 
member states supported ukraine by launching a project called V4 Roadshow in 
Ukraine in 2014 with the aim to facilitate ukrainian public administration re-
forms and allocated about euR 1,240,000 from the Visegrad fund at the very 
same year for programmes supporting ukraine. apart from the commitment to 
the eastern Partnership, the slovakian presidency confirmed yet again the will-
ingness to provide aid to the Western Balkan countries by launching an initiative 
called Western Balkans Expert Network, under which a seminar in Omšen on 13–
–15 October 2014 was held (among others) including a training course for judicial 
staff. furthermore, in the time frame discussed above, the slovakian diplomacy 
organised two summits of the prime ministers of the V4 member states in the so-
called “expanded format”. On 9 December 2014, a meeting took place in Bratisl-
ava attended by the president of the swiss Confederation Didier Burkhalter, cover-
ing the issues of cooperation between the V4 member states and switzerland with 
a particular focus on the co-funding provided by switzerland to projects related to 
the eastern Partnership developed by the international Visegrad fund. The sum-
mit resulted in a common declaration that was proclaimed after the meeting of the 
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prime ministers of the V4 countries and the president of the swiss Confederation. 
The slovakian presidency ended with a summit of the prime ministers of the V4 
member states on 19 June 2015 in Bratislava with the presence of president of the 
french republic françois Hollande as the guest of honour. The main subjects dis-
cussed at the meeting included the preparations for the 21st Global Climate Con-
ference planned for December 2015 in Paris and current issues, such as the matter 
of common security and defence policy within the eu and problems arising from 
the migrant crisis. apart from this particular event, meetings between the heads 
of states of the V4 countries and the presidents of ukraine and Germany took 
place on 16 November 2014 in Bratislava. another important event on the V4+ 
forum was the meeting between the foreign ministers and the delegation of the 
Republic of korea that occurred on 17 July 2014 in Bratislava, during which a fi-
nancial contribution of euR 336,000 allocated by korea to the V4 countries with 
the aim to support several projects for the Western Balkans financed by the inter-
national Visegrad fund was acknowledged. Between July 2014 and June 2015, 
meetings between ministers of defence and military experts were also held, which 
brought a recommendation for the eu member states to ensure a closer coopera-
tion within the european security strategy (Report of the Slovak, 2014/2015). The 
last full presidency of 2015–2016 was led by the Czech Republic with focus on 
areas where cooperation has been maintained throughout former presidencies. 
The prevailing issues concerned the migrant crisis, which was a subject that dom-
inated the subsequent three summits of the prime ministers of the V4 member 
states: the extraordinary summit on migration on 4 september 2015, the summit 
on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the formation of the Visegrad Group on 
15 february 2016, and a closing summit on 8 June 2016 in Prague. The migrant 
crisis was also the cause of many meetings arranged between foreign ministers, 
interior ministers and defence ministers, whereas final documents received during 
those meetings confirmed the voluntary nature of solidarity activities of the eu 
member states to be a sensible solution and negated the obligatory mechanism of 
accepting immigrants or refugees by member states, which was imposed by france 
and Germany. at the same time, they recommended protection of the eu external 
borders. as the advocate of the Visegrad fund as an important tool for imple-
menting V4 programmes, the Czech diplomacy organised a conference on 25 May 
2016 in Prague to which present and potential donors were invited. an unques-
tionable success of the Czech presidency was the final establishment of the V4 
battlegroup and its certification. The cooperation within the V4 + format was also 
continued, particularly with the countries of the Nordic Defence Cooperation 
(NORDefCO) and the usa. in conclusion, the analysis of activities taken dur-
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ing subsequent presidencies from the time of the proclamation of the Kroměříž 
Declaration in 2004 shows that the V4 member states use all the available instru-
ments necessary for conducting operations in the area of the Common foreign 
and security Policy. These include not only official summits of prime ministers, 
foreign ministers or defence ministers, but also working meetings of experts con-
cerning both execution of actions at the level of data collection, analytical level, 
expert level or even military level. The most commonly implemented action is the 
collaboration with countries that apply or aspire for the eu or NatO member-
ship, which consists in supporting reforms vital for pursuing their european or 
euro-atlantic objectives, as in the case of the Western Balkan countries. similar 
actions pertain to Belarus, ukraine, Moldavia and the south Caucasus where V4 
acts as a strong advocate for democratic transitions. at the same time, it seems that 
the implementation of the eastern Partnership has become a long-term project of 
V4. The constant policy of the Visegrad Group is to attempt at reaching consensus 
and establishing a common position of the V4 member states regarding prepara-
tions for the european Council, the foreign affairs Council or the General af-
fairs Council. it seems also that the intention of the V4 member states is to pro-
mote possible common concepts and proposals that reflect common interests of 
the Visegrad Group, though one ought to take into account the divergence of the 
national interests of individual V4 member states or priority setting that depends 
on the international situation (2015/2016 Czech Presidency).
Over the last five years, after the events of the arab spring and the ukrainian 
crisis, significant changes have taken place in the global environment, resulting 
in a necessity to redefine the eu security strategy both internally (The European 
Agenda on Security, 2015) and externally (The EU Global Strategy Policy on Foreign 
and Security Policy, 2016). Both the arab spring and the ukrainian crisis and 
their implications proved yet again how difficult it is to develop a common posi-
tion within the eu. Differences between the member states regarding reaction 
and methods for tackling the crises triggered a crisis within the eu. Particularities 
of individual states pertaining to the execution of foreign and security policy have 
shown that the idea of CfsP is still far from solidarity. The Visegrad Group has 
taken a stance regarding both crises in an attempt to win over other eu member 
states, with varying effects. as a process of democratisation of the North african 
countries, the arab spring was not controversial as such and found full support 
in the european Community. Nevertheless, the consequences of the arab spring, 
including mass migrant influx largely from syria, where the arab spring ended in 
a tragic civil war, have brought to light substantial differences between the mem-
ber states. in 2015, in the face of an unusual migratory pressure, the european 
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Commission proposed a mechanism for relocating immigrants arriving in europe 
that would allow to ease the load on the southern countries. On 22 september 
2015, the european Council accepted the proposal of the european Commission 
under which Poland should admit 5,082 individuals, the Czech Republic – 1,591, 
slovakia – 802 and Hungary – 1,294 (Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601). The new 
Polish government that has emerged from the parliamentary election in October 
has put to question the commitments made by its predecessors and launched an 
active campaign for a voluntary refugee admission system. to this end, Polish di-
plomacy has activated the Visegrad Group and over the following months asylum 
and migration policy of the eu has become one of the prevailing subjects on the 
V4 forum. On 3 December 2015, at the meeting of the heads of the V4 govern-
ments with the president of south korea in Prague it was decided, that “The 
December european Council will be an opportunity to proceed further also in 
addressing the migration-related challenges and their root causes. This implies al-
locating adequate financial resources in the european union budget, while other 
essential european policies, namely growth-oriented instruments such as cohesion 
policy, must not be affected. any proposals that would follow such logic will meet 
our resolute rejection” (Joint Statement, 2015). The aim of the identification of 
a conflict between the eu asylum policy and cohesion policy was largely to affect 
the public in the V4 countries by creating an impression that asylum policy was 
to be funded at the expense of the development of east-Central europe. subse-
quent summits of 2016 were also dominated by this issue. The migration crisis was 
declared at the february summit to be a problem affecting the entire eu (Joint 
Statement on Migration, 2016), though to a different extent, yet at the June sum-
mit it was noted, that “With migration remaining the key challenge of the day, the 
Visegrad Group countries are convinced that it is essential to seek common and 
coherent european solutions which focus on tackling the root causes of the cur-
rent migratory pressure, including ending of war in syria and iraq and stabilising 
of situation in libya. (…) The countries of the Visegrad Group believe that the 
objective of the eu policy should be to ensure the reduction of the mixed migra-
tory pressure on europe by identifying genuine asylum seekers and through an 
integrated set of CfsP/CsDP/Development policy tools including the considera-
tion of establishing of hotspots outside the territory of the eu and the protection 
of external borders” (Joint Statements of the Heads, 2016). This approach to the 
issue of the migrant crisis was subject to criticism by most eu member states as it 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the idea of european solidarity.
The situation was thoroughly different when it comes to the reaction of V4 to 
the ukrainian crisis, which was a subject raised at almost every V4 meeting held 
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in 2014 regardless of its level. However, according to a documentation analysis, 
the interest of the Visegrad Group was highly superficial and limited merely to ex-
pressing concern with the development of events in ukraine and the possible esca-
lation of the conflict. The reaction of V4 to the situation in ukraine is problematic, 
as on one hand, historical experience calls for maintaining utmost cautiousness in 
relations with Russia, yet on the other, there are also economic interests. for that 
very reason, two approaches within V4 can be determined: the Polish approach 
and the Czech-slovakian-Hungarian approach (kucharczyk, Mesežnikov, 2015). 
in this regard, the position that thoroughly condemned Russia’s actions, which 
was adopted by Poland, can be regarded as the most radical. Poland was also the 
main advocate of imposing economic sanctions on Russia on the eu forum. Po-
land’s policy was driven largely by loyalty towards ukraine and a concern about 
further destabilisation of the largest eastern neighbour. Due to numerous eco-
nomic links the other V4 countries avoided making any unambiguous statements 
or providing unequivocal support to ukraine in fear that their relations with Rus-
sia might become sour. additionally, in January 2015, the so-called “slavkov tri-
angle” was formed as a new regional cooperation format involving austria, the 
Czech Republic and slovakia with the official aim to promote economic coopera-
tion including transport and energy, though in fact, to facilitate rapprochement to 
Russia (kałan, 2015).
Here, one should also note the positive aspects of military cooperation. The 
first plans for creating a battlegroup by the V4 member states appeared as early 
as in 2007, though they proved unsuccessful at the time (Ciupiński, 2014). This 
idea came to the fore in 2013, when a letter of intent on joint establishment of the 
european union battlegroup was signed. The battlegroup was designed to serve 
in the first half of 2016 (lorenz, 2013). The plan was successfully implemented 
and on 18 November 2015 in the land Operations Centre in Cracow the V4 eu 
Operational and tactical Command was inaugurated. The command comprising 
Polish, Czech, slovakian and Hungarian soldiers began its half-year call of duty 
on 1 January 2016. Poland provided a main battalion, support units and opera-
tional command composed of 950 soldiers in total. The Czech Republic delegated 
750 soldiers, while Hungary and slovakia 400 each. The eu Battlegroups are 
intended to participate in humanitarian missions, preventive missions and stabili-
sation missions with the aim to enforce or maintain peace. in the case of a decision 
to intervene, a battlegroup must respond within 10 days of that date and should be 
prepared for sustainable operation for 30 days, optionally extendable to 120 days.
in conclusion, in the face of crises that have brought or might bring in the 
future serious implications for both military and non-military security of the east-
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Central europe, the V4 countries are driven by pragmatism and specific interests. 
The migrant crisis proved that it is possible to develop a common position and to 
advocate it within the eu, oftentimes against the political line of the largest euro-
pean countries. However, this raises a question regarding the cost of such policy. 
Due to the lack of a broader coalition capability within the eu, initiatives of this 
kind are bound to fail. Moreover, the lack of solidarity regarding pan-european is-
sues might prove to result in the future in a lack of solidarity in matters significant 
to V4 member states. What is more, it should be noted that despite the improve-
ment in the Visegrad cooperation observed since the end of 2015, its effectiveness 
is not regarded as satisfactory. This is largely due to political problems and im-
age issues of Hungary and Poland on the european stage after the controversial 
changes in the political systems introduced by their governments. another issue 
is the lack of internal cohesion among the V4 countries, which has become clear 
particularly due to the ukrainian crisis. The unquestionable positive aspect here 
is the establishment of the battlegroup, which shows that at present implement-
ing common measures in CfsP comes easier than taking a common position in 
a spirit of european cooperation.
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